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Abstract. In 1983, US Minerals Management Service (MMS) switched from the Lease Nomination 
sale format to Area-Wide Leasing (AWL). Since a complete econometric analysis of the effects of 
AWL on government revenue has not been conducted in almost twenty years, the purpose of this study 
was to determine the effects of AWL on government revenue. Results indicated that AWL reduced 
government revenue by $1,170 to $1,308 on a per acre basis, which is consistent with the findings in 
prior literature.  
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1 The opinion, findings, and results in this paper are solely of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the 
Minerals Management Service, Department of the Interior, or any other Federal or State agency.     2 
1.0 Introduction and Purpose 
The Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) is thought to have great potential to supplement US long-
term energy needs. The US Minerals Management Service (MMS) oversees the leasing and revenue 
collection  for  the  OCS.  For  oil  and  gas  specifically,  offshore  tracts  of  land  are  leased  to  private 
companies, giving them rights to explore, develop, and produce any petroleum resources. In the lease 
auctions, the winning cash bid is referred to as the “high bonus bid”, and once production begins 
lessees pay royalties on any production.   
In 1983, MMS switched from the Lease Nomination sale format to Area-Wide Leasing (AWL). 
In the Lease Nomination sale design, companies nominate tracts in the OCS and request that MMS put 
the respective tracts up for auction. Tracts identified by companies would subsequently be evaluated 
by MMS officials  for  resource viability  and, in most cases, would be  offered in  a future sale.  In 
contrast, the Area-Wide Lease sale design offered very large areas such as the entire Gulf of Mexico, 
and companies would bid on the tracts of interest.   
Proponents of AWL in 1983 suggested that the program would increase the overall supply of 
oil in the US. However, critics also suggested that by increasing the supply of leases in a given sale, 
lease  prices  would  decline  and  government  revenue  would  fall.  In  fact,  the  US  Governmental 
Accountability (US GAO, 1985) Office estimated that Area-Wide Leasing resulted in an annual loss of 
seven billion dollars to the federal government. However, MMS officials did not agree (US GAO, 
1986) that revenue fell due to ALW, as the notable drop in lease prices after 1983 was due to the world 
wide decline for petroleum.   
Another contentious issue as a result of AWL was the unintended effects on states; critics 
indicated that the newly adopted lease design would cause the revenue of coastal producers to fall. 
Since coastal states receive a share of the revenue of offshore oil and gas production, an additional 
consequence  of  AWL  may  be  that  states  such  as  Louisiana  would  lose  revenue.  
Although several reports by US Governmental Accountability Office supported the notion that AWL   3 
resulted in a decline in revenues to the federal government and coastal states, Moody et al. (1990) 
examined the welfare effects of switching from the tract-nomination sale process to area-wide leasing 
in 1983. The discrete choice two-stage probit analysis showed that the 1983 change to AWL, which 
increased the number of tracts offered, resulted in a higher supply of petroleum on the world market. 
However, the authors also noted that the increased supply caused oil prices to drop- resulting in a 
transfer of wealth from coastal to offshore producers. Also noted was the substantial reduction in 
government revenues. 
Since a complete econometric analysis of the effects of AWL on government revenue in the 
Gulf of Mexico has not been conducted in almost twenty years, the purpose of the present study was to 
determine the effects of MMS policy on OCS offshore domestic oil and gas production, government 
revenues, and substitute coastal producers between 1979 to 2006. Specifically, I address whether AWL 
results in lower government revenue and high bonus bids in the Gulf of Mexico. As noted, in OCS 
lease  auction  the  “high  bonus  bid”  is  the  winning  cash  bid  for  the  respective  lease.  I  apply  an 
econometric model to a large, recently-developed spatial data set and examine factors that influence 
leasing such as royalty rates, policy, and exogenous land characteristics. Corresponding changes in 
welfare are calculated based on variations in the policy.  
The  plan  of  this  research  paper  is  as  follows.  First,  I  address  the  recent  literature  that 
investigates the influence of AWL. Next, a conceptual model is developed and is used to specify the 
econometric  bonus  bidding  model.  I  follow  with  a  description  of  the  data.  Next,  I  use  multiple 
regression analysis to identify the isolated effect of AWL on government revenue. Model results are 
subsequently presented, and implications for policy are discussed. 
 
2.0 Background and Prior Literature 
Very little research has addressed the effects of AWL.  However, I summarize the notable 
studies that have implications for this analysis.     4 
With the surge in worldwide oil prices in the seventies, several studies emerged to bridge our 
understanding of optimal fiscal policy and OCS leasing. Importantly, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO, 1985) reported that the switch to AWL resulted in $3 to $7 billion in annual losses to the 
federal government.  
A few years later, Farrow (1987) used an econometric model to estimate effects of AWL on 
bonus bids. The author used a two-stage equation, where the first stage was the number of bids and the 
second stage was high bonus bid. The model also used dummy variables for various types of OCS 
leases such as Drainage, Wildcat, and Proven leases. Farrow (1987) found, based on his sample, that 
AWL did not have a statistically significant effect on bonus bids.  
Moody et al. (1990) subsequently examined effects of AWL with the most robust econometric 
analysis of AWL to date. In contrast to Farrow (1987), the authors noted the significant drop in bonus 
bids from AWL. Moody
2 et al. (1990) also expressed concern about the effect of AWL on coastal 
states in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM): 
“Lower lease prices could result in a transfer of wealth to the oil companies bidding on OCS leases. 
Tracts owned by coastal states are substitutes for OCS tracts. These tract values can be expected to 
decline  with  OCS  lease  prices,  representing  a  significant  loss  of  revenue  to  states  with  offshore 
deposits, especially Texas and Louisiana (p.30)”.  
 
Clearly, AWL was a very controversial policy decision. In fact, White (1984) noted that the 
governor of Texas had a particular objection to the MMS policy and indicated that the decline in lease 
prices due to AWL caused massive losses to the state. The governor also expressed concern that AWL 
would result in a windfall gain to oil producers, clearly a concern in a current era of record high oil 
prices where a given barrel of crude petroleum exceeds one hundred dollars per barrel, even after 
correcting for inflation.  
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  According to Moody et al. (1990), MMS officials disagreed that AWL resulted in a decline in 
lease prices and government revenue. In fact, MMS officials stated that there was no evidence to 
suggest that MMS was receiving less for a given block as a result of AWL (US Department of the 
Interior, 1984). Instead, MMS officials contended the drop in lease prices after 1983 was a reflection 
of the overall worldwide drop in petroleum resources worldwide. MMS also argued that many tracts in 
AWL had previously been picked over and were tracts that were reoffered from prior sales. Also, 
MMS suggested that many tracts in AWL were in deeper water. Given the increased of drilling and 
exploration risks in tracts in deeper water in the OCS, the decrease in lease prices via AWL was a 
result of the decreased demand for deepwater tracts (US Department of the Interior, 1984, 13).  
  In order to econometrically estimate the changes in bonus bids as a result of AWL, Moody et 
al. (1990) used a two stage model. The first stage of the model was the number of bids, and the second 
stage was the bonus bid. The two stage model was used to take into account the endogeneity of number 
of bids in the bonus bids model.   
The authors used panel data to reflect the information from multiple bids occurring over time; 
there were many sales in each year, and each sale had tracts with unique characteristics. Results from 
the  econometric  analysis  were  fairly  conclusive.  Based  on  the  sample,  AWL  was  statistically 
significant in lowering bonus bids and lease prices. As such, the isolated effect of AWL on bonus bids 
was unambiguously negative based on the sample. For example, the authors estimated that the switch 
to AWL resulted in a loss of 2.6 billion dollars in annual federal revenue, approximately $1337 per 
acre- even in 1986 when oil prices had surged to an all time high (p. 37). 
Next, IIedare (2004) et al. quantified the empirical determinants of high bonus bids for oil and 
gas  leases  in  the  OCS.  The  authors  used  the  log  of  high  bonuses  as  the  dependent  variable  with 
multiple regression, as explained by number of bids
3, oil price, location, bidding arrangement (i.e., 
                                                 
3 It is worth noting that IIedare (2004) used number of bids as an independent variable to explain high bonuses. However, 
Moody et al. (1990) and Farrow (1995) used two stage least squares to account for number of bids as an endogenous   6 
joint or single bid), firm size, water depth, and dummy variables that represent Wildcat, Development, 
and Proven leases. The results of the regression indicate that approximately 34% of the variation in the 
dependent  variable  (high  bonus  bid)  is  explained  by  the  variation  in  the  explanatory  variables. 
IIedare’s (2004) model utilized data subsequent to the implementation of AWL and is therefore not 
directly applicable in explaining impacts of AWL on government revenue. However, the regression 
model is useful for our purposes in determining an appropriate specification for this analysis. 
Over  a  decade  passed  before  Hurricane  Katrina  generated  a  renewed  interest  in  AWL. 
Recently, Nebresky (2007) showed that the quantity of oil and gas leases increased significantly with 
the  implementation  of  AWL  on  Alaska’s  North  Slope  in  1998.    Using  Two  Stage  Least  Squares 
(2SLS), the author estimated the change in bonus bids per acre from AWL.  Similar to Moody et al. 
(1990) and Farrow (1987), the first stage of the model was number of bids, and the second stage was 
high  bonus.  Explanatory  variables  included  oil  prices,  endogenous  firm  costs,  location,  resource 
viability, etc. The authors found that the decline in bonus bid per acre with AWL dropped $1136 per 
acre
4 (p.170).  
  The implications of the prior studies are as follows. First, Two Stage Least Squares is most 
likely the preferred econometric estimator to explain effects of AWL on high bonus, since bidding 
variables  are  often  endogenous.  Secondly,  prior  literature  tells  us  that  the  following  variables  are 
commonly used to explain high bonuses: number of bids, oil price, location, bidding arrangement (i.e., 
joint or single bid), firm size, water depth, and dummy variables that represent Wildcat, Development, 
and Proven leases. Lastly, over the range of the data for the prior studies, AWL has been found to be a 
statistically significant variable and has an inverse effect in determining high bonuses. However, the 
results from the prior studies are not  conclusive. For example, although Moody  et  al. (1990) and 
                                                                                                                                                                       
variable. Number of bids cannot be used as an explanatory variable in this regression and the results from IIedare (2004) 
are, by definition, biased and inconsistent,  
4 Specifically, on page 170 the author indicates that the price per acre under AWL was $55 and the price under the tract 
nomination system was $1191 per acre. The approximate loss in bonuses was therefore $1136/acre ($1190-$55).    7 
Nebresky  (2007)  found  that  AWL  decreases  bonuses,  Farrow  (1987)  found  that  AWL  had  no 
significantly significant effect on high bonuses.  
  The following conceptual framework illustrates the effects of AWL on bonuses. I used simple 
Laws of Supply and Demand, as applied to OCS leases, to generate a hypothesis that will be tested 
econometrically in the empirical context of this analysis.  
 
3.0 Conceptual Framework 
  Following  Moody  et  al.  (1990)  closely,  the  market  for  OCS  leases  can  be  expressed  as 
functions of Supply and Demand in Figure 1. The vertical axis represents the price of a given OCS 
lease, as determined by winning high bonus bid in an OCS lease sale. The horizontal axis is the 
quantity  of  OCS  leases,  as  determined  by  MMS.    Initial  Supply  (S0)  of  OCS  leases  is  perfectly 
inelastic, since MMS determines quantity. OCS producers face a downward sloping initial Demand 
function (D0), due to the Law of Demand.  Initial equilibrium price (P0) and quantity of (Q0) OCS 
leases are also shown in Figure 1.  Equilibrium price and quantity represent the point where the market 
for OCS leases “clears,” where the quantity demanded of OCS leases equals the quantity of OCS 
leases awarded by MMS.  
  The introduction of AWL resulted in a massive increase in the number of awarded leases in the 
OCS. For example, IIedare et al. (2004) noted that the average number of tracts per sale under the 
nomination system was about 300, while the average number of tracts awarded under AWL averaged 
5000 (p.240).  Given that OCS Supply of leases are the individual sum of horizontal Supply curves, the 
Supply function would therefore, by definition, shift rightwards under AWL. The new equilibrium 
lease price and quantity is now P1 and Q1.  
  Moody et al. (1990) noted that MMS officials disagreed that AWL results in a drop in OCS 
bonuses (p. 30, 31).  Instead, MMS believed that the lower resulting bonuses after 1982 corresponded 
to the worldwide drop in the demand for petroleum resource, as expressed by D1.  The resulting new    8 





Figure 1.  The vertical axis represents the price of a given OCS lease, as determined by winning high bonus bid in an OCS 
lease sale. The horizontal axis is the quantity of OCS leases, as awarded and determined by MMS. Initial Supply (S0) of 
OCS leases is perfectly inelastic. OCS producers face a downward sloping initial Demand function (D0), due to the Law of 
Demand. Moody et al. (1990) noted that MMS officials disagreed that AWL results in a drop in OCS lease prices and lower 
bonuses (p. 30, 31). Instead, MMS believed that the lower resulting bonuses after 1982 corresponded to the worldwide drop 
in the demand for petroleum resource, as expressed by D1. The resulting new equilibrium price and quantity from the lower 
demand D1 are expressed as P2 and Q0.  In reality, the lower lease prices and bonuses subsequent to 1982 were probably the 
result of a combination of AWL and the fall in the world wide demand for petroleum, as given by P3 and Q0. However, in a 
time of soaring gas prices, it is unlikely that the demand for OCS remains at D1. Clearly, the demand function D2 and 
equilibrium price and quantity P4 and Q1 are more representative of the current market for petroleum resource.  
 
equilibrium price and quantity from the lower demand D1 are expressed as P2 and Q0.  In reality, the 
lower lease prices and bonuses subsequent to 1982 were probably the result of a combination of AWL 
and the fall in the world-wide demand for petroleum, as given by P3 and Q1. 
  However,  in  the  current  era  of  soaring  gas  prices,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  demand  for  OCS 
remains at D1. Clearly, the demand function D2 and equilibrium price and quantity P4 and Q1 are more 
representative of the current market for petroleum resources. Based on the simple Laws of Supply and 
Demand, the isolated effect of an increase of leases from AWL would force lease prices and bonuses   9 
to fall. However, given that OCS leases are a Factor Demand (i.e., land) for oil producers, Demand for 
leases should rise.  If the shift in Demand is greater than the shift in Supply, bonuses will increase after 
AWL. However, if shift in Demand is less than the shift in Supply, bonuses will increase after AWL. 
Given the massive increase in number of awarded leases, I hypothesize that bonuses will fall with the 
implementation of AWL. The following section discusses the data.  
 
4.0 Data Structure 
  I utilize publicly available data for OCS issued leases from the public MMS website
5, sold in 
1979-1996.  Data  include  various  tract  characteristics  such  as  location,  water  depth,  royalty  rates, 
proven tracts, and any prior leasing or development at the same location. A spatial database with 
distances to the nearest active lease is also included
6.  Table 1 provides definitions and summary 
statistics for parameters used in this analysis. The following is a description of the data as well as each 
variable’s expected relationship with high bonus bid: 
1.  N_Bids. N_Bids is the variable that represents the number of bids associated with each lease 
sale. A positive and statistically significant sign is anticipated for N_Bids, as the number of 





                                                 
5 Data was obtained from the public MMS website. The “Swiler” report with information on bonus bids and other statistics 
are available at: http://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/lsesale/swiler/Table_1.PDF .  
6The spatial database was created by existing MMS databases contain explicit data such as Lease Boundary Vertices, Lease 
Effective Date, Lease Status Code, etc.  As an example block boundary vertices can be used to compute the center of the 
block. Using the center of the blocks then inter block distances were computed. Then using lease effective date and lease 
expiration data a temporal dimension of the database were generated. Block vertices are available for download 
http://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/pubinfo/repcat/arcinfo/index.html.  Data such as tract depth, royalty rates, lease status, 
and lease type are available at: http://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/pubinfo/freeasci/leasing/freeleas.html 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable    Definition                     
.   
 
1. Dependent Variable: 
 
High_Bid     High winning bonus bid                
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
2. Independent Variables: 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
N_Bids    Number of bids 
                                  
OilPrice    Inflation adjusted real price of a barrel of oil                       
 
Depth    Water depth of tract                                   
 
Risk    Economic risk associated with the tract                      
 
Produced     Whether tract has produced in the past               
         
Reoffered  If tract was not sold in prior sale, reoffered in this sale                        
       
Acres  Acres of particular tract                         
 
Area-Wide  Dummy variable for AWL (=1 after 1982; =0 prior to 1983)   
 
Geol  Evidence that the given tract has petroleum resources 
                       
L12  Number active leases within 12 mile radius                         
 
L30  Number active leases within 30 mile radius                     
 
Wildcat  Lease that has never been drilled                        
 
Drainage  Lease near proven area and shares similar characteristics                
 
Proven  Lease proven to have petroleum resource                    
 
Development  Lease that has been drilled but is yet to produce                    
 




2.  OilPrice. Due to the Law of Supply, the real price of a barrel of oil should clearly have a 
significant and direct relationship with bidding decisions.  
3.  Depth. The water depth associated with the particular lease is expected to have an inverse 
relationship with high bonus bid since tracts in deeper water offer more elements of risk to oil 
producers. 
4.  Risk. The parameter for risk is an index of the variability associated with Net Income of oil 
companies; the standard deviation of net income to oil producers is used to proxy economic   11 
risk. The expected sign for this variable is ambiguous and is determined by the individual 
producer’s level of risk aversion.  
5.  Produced. Whether the tract has produced in the past, and is anticipated to have a positive 
effect on bidding.  
6.  Reoffered. Reoffered is the variable that represents whether a tract was not leased in a previous 
sale, and it has been reoffered in the current sale. It is anticipated that this variable will be 
inversely related to high bonuses, since tracts that are reoffered were not leased in the prior sale 
are indication that the given tract was not desirable to OCS producers.  
7.  Geol. Geol is a variable to represent evidence that the given tract has petroleum resources, and 
is expected to have a direct relationship with high bonuses.  
8.  L12. L12 is the number of active leases within a twelve mile radius, which is expected to be 
positively related to high bonus bid. The radius of twelve miles was used for this variable since 
this radius would encompass all abutting tracts to the given tract.  
9.  L30.  L30  is  the  number  of  active  leases  within  a  30  mile  radius,  and  is  anticipated  to  be 
expected to be directly related to the high bonus bid. The 30 mile radius includes all active 
leases that are “abutting the abutting” leases to the given tract; L30 is actually the outer ring of 
active leases, and that does not include L12 leases.   
10. Acres. Acres is the variable that represents the number of acres on the respective OCS tract, 
and is expected to positively related to bidding.  
11. Wildcat. The Wildcat variable represents a lease that is known to have petroleum resources, 
but has yet to be leased or actually produced. The expected sign for this variable is positive.  
12. Drainage.  Drainage  leases  are  abutting  proven  tracts  and  share  similar  geological 
characteristics. It is very likely that the regression will yield positive and statistically significant 
results to explain bonus bids.    12 
13. Development.  Development  leases  have  been  drilled  but  have  yet  to  produce  petroleum 
resources. We would expect that the isolated effect of a development lease on bidding to be 
positive.  
14. Proven. Proven leases have been shown to have petroleum resources. The isolated effect of this 
variable on bidding is positive.  
15. Royalty Rate. Royalty is the amount paid to the federal government for the leasing of land in 
the OCS, and is defined as a percentage of gross production. Ceteris Paribus, due to the Law of 
Demand, the isolated effect of increased royalty should decrease bidding, since royalty is a 
function of the Input Demand function for OCS producers.  
16. Area-Wide. Area-Wide is our main policy variable and is a dummy variable that indicates the 
switch to AWL in 1983. Clearly, from theory, historical evidence, and prior literature we would 
expect that the influence of AWL on high bonus bids to be negative, Ceteris Parabis. 
  The  following  section  describes  the  econometric  specification  used  in  this  analysis.  I 
subsequently present results and implications for policy. 
 
5.0 Econometric Specification, Results, and Policy Implications 
Econometric Specification   
In  order  to  econometrically  test
7  the  effect  of  AWL  on  high  bonus  bids,  I  used  multiple 
regression analysis. Since the data for this analysis takes the form of multiple lease sales from 1979 to 
1996
8,  several  panel  data  models  were  tested  in  regression  to  explain  bonus  bids.  First  of  all,  I 
considered the Fixed Effects (FE) model. The FE model would be useful for our purposes because it 
allows for unique intercepts across panels and increases statistical efficiency. However, one limitation 
                                                 
7 I employ various hypothesis tests in order to ensure regression estimates are consistent, efficient, and unbiased If the 
estimator is found to be inconsistent, inefficient, or undbiased, MLR will not provide reliable predictions on the influence 
of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable.   
 
8 I used data between 1979 to 1996 because creation of the Spatial Database eliminated most observations before 1979 and 
subsequent to 1996.   13 
of the FE model is that it only accounts for variation within panels. As such, the FE model could not be 
used in this analysis because it ignores variation across panels and our policy variable for AWL could 
not be included in the model.  
  The Random Effects (RE) model was also used to estimate high bonuses various regressions. 
The advantage of the RE model is that variation across panels as well as within panels is included in 
the  regression.  Unfortunately,  the  unique  Variance-Covariance  matrix  in  RE  makes  is  subject  to 
inconsistency of the model due to independent variables being correlated with the error term. In the RE 
model,  the  “composite”  error  term  is  often  correlated  with  explanatory  variables  and  is  often 
inconsistent. Hypothesis tests revealed that the RE model of bonus bids is inconsistent at the 99% 
confidence level, and is therefore not appropriate for this analysis. 
The preferred estimator is 2SLS with a pooled Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression 
model, since N_Bids is an endogenous variable.  Using a variant of the Hausman Specification test, the 
null hypothesis of exogeneity of N_Bids was rejected at the 99% confidence level. The test indicates 
that if we had assumed N_Bids was exogenous, OLS would have returned biased and inconsistent 
regression estimates.  Similarly, using the Breusch Pegan test, the null hypothesis of constant variance 
was  soundly  rejected  at  the  99%  confidence  level.  In  this  case,  if  we  had  used  OLS  regression 
estimates would have been inefficient and standard errors would have been inflated.  
Lastly, I tested for the presence of omitted variables in the regression specification. I rejected 
the null hypothesis of no omiited variables at the 99% significance level. Clearly, it is not surprising 
that there are omitted variables present in a model that explains bonus bidding in the OCS since there 
are so many unknown factors that could influence bidding.  
  I used the Box-Cox method to evaluate alternative functional forms for the regression function. 
This  method  transforms  the  dependent  variable,  independent  variables,  or  both,  to  identify  the 
appropriate nonlinear transformation. Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991, pp. 240-243) define the Box-Cox 









l l   - -
=b + b +e   l l   ∑  
where y is the dependent variable, xi is the ith independent variable, the b’s are regression parameters, 
e is a stochastic error term, and the l’s are  Box-Cox parameters.  If l1 = l2 = 1, equation (4) is 
equivalent to the linear form  0 1 ( 1) i i i y x - =b + b - +e ∑ . If l1 = l2 = 0, then (in the limit) equation (4) 
becomes the double log form  ∑ e + b + b =
i i i x y ln ln 0 . A third possibility is l1 = 0 and l2 = 1, where 
(4) is equivalent to the semi-exponential form  0 ln i i i y x =b + b +e ∑ . Various models were fit with 
alternative values of l1 and l2, and the results were compared based on overall goodness-of-fit. These 
comparisons suggested the most appropriate of the three models for our bidding equation was the 
linear functional form (l1 = l2 = 1).  
Results 
Table 2 shows results for the regression analysis of high bonuses. Only the second stage of the 
2SLS models are shown. Four models are used to estimate the effects of exogenous influences
9 on high 
bonuses on OCS leases including a Base Model, Lease Model, Spatial Model, and Combined Model.  
The  Base  Model  includes  a  set  of  exogenous  variables  that  were  found  to  be  statistically 
significant  in most regression tests, and also includes the main policy variables such as OilPrice and 
Area.  The  lease  model  includes  all  the  variables  in  the  Base  Model,  plus  dummy  variables  for 
Drainage, Proven, and Wildcat Leases. Development leases were excluded to avoid a dummy variable 
trap.  
The Spatial Model includes all the variables for the Base Model plus the spatial variables L_12 
and L_30. Recall that L_12 is the number of active leases in a twelve mile radius and is hypothesized 
to directly affect bonuses.  Similarly, L_30 is the number of active leases in a 30 mile radius and is  
 
                                                 
9 In all models, Following Moody et al. (1990) N_Bids is an endogenous variable, and is instrumented by the geological 
viability of the OCS tract.   15 
Table 2
Ψ: Two Stage Least Squares Regression Results 
 
     
Variable    Base Model  Lease Model        Spatial Model      Combined Model 
 
 
Constant    2767887    776415.1          2.28e+07*        3.22e+07* 
 
N_Bids    1723532    2554914***        -1378896            -1245582 
 
OilPrice    91544***    91141***          289305***        330828.8 ***   
 
Depth    -1613 ***   -1609***          -------        ------- 
 
Risk    39984 *    22859          3291609***        3645359* 
 
Viability    -767     -1764          -152903           -183490* 
         
Reoffered  -1.03e+07***  -9837914***       -------        -------     
     
Acres  78.00    59.00          -------        ------- 
 
Area-Wide  -7544483***  -6740769***       -3.42e+07***        -3.46e+07 *** 
 
L12  -------    -------          38081.99           35816.99    
           
L30  -------    -------          21806*        17037.72      
 
Wildcat  -------    -------          -------        ------- 
 
Drainage  -------    1586464***        -------        6928404 
 
Proven  -------    1203873          -------        1.85e+07     
 
Development  -------    -1099430           -------        -8832049    
 
Royalty  -------    -------          -------        -790560* 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations  6890     6890          428        428     
F-Statistic  72.55      64.55            9.39        6.28      
Prob > F        0.0000        0.0000          0.0000        0.0000           
Adj R-squared  0.2639      0.2971          0.3578        0.3733 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Ψ
 *** indicates 99% level of confidence, ** indicates 95% level of confidence, * indicates 90% level of confidence 
expected to have a positive effect on leasing. The Combined Model includes the variables in the Base 
model plus leasing dummy variables, spatial variables, and the variable for royalty rate. 
Results  in  the  base  model  indicate  that  OilPrice,  Depth,  and  Reoffered  are  statistically 
significant and have the expected sign according to our hypothesis from theory. For example, OilPrice 
is positive indicating that the isolated effect of an exogenous increase in real oil prices has a direct 
effect on bonuses. Also, reoffered is negative and significant, which is consistent with our hypothesis 
since these are tracts that were not sold in prior sales and therefore are less desirable to OCS producers. 
Also, the influence of increased depth on bonuses is negative; the isolated effect of an increase in water 
depth causes a reduction in bonuses for the firms in this sample. Several other variables in the Base   16 
Model were either insignificant or an unexpected sign. Given that our prior hypothesis tests indicated 
the presence of omitted variables at the 99% confidence level, the sign reversals in this model are not 
surprising.  
The most profound result in the Base Model is the coefficient on Area-Wide. The parameter is 
significant at the 99% confidence level, and yields a negative sign. Assuming that an average OCS 
tract is 5760 acres, the average amount that an AWL reduces bonuses
10 is approximately $1309.80 per 
acre (=$7,544,483/5760). The result is comparable to Moody et al. (1990) and Nebresky (2007), which 
found that AWL drops bonuses by $1337 and $1136 per acre, respectively. 
  The Lease Model provides similar results for signs and statistical significance of parameters. 
More importantly, the model indicates over the given sample that the reduction per acre as a result of 
AWL is approximately $1170 (=$6,740,769/5,760).  
  Although the Spatial and Combined Model produce interesting results, a significant amount of 
observations were lost in creation of the spatial variables. As such, the Spatial and Combined models 
are  probably  not  as  reliable  for  policy  interpretation.  For  example,  notice  the  massive  loss  in 
observations in the Base and Lease Model from over 6000 observations to less than 500 observations 
in the Spatial and Combined Model. In addition, although the F-Statistics in the Spatial and Combined 
models are significant, the drop in magnitude in the F-Statistic is of concern.  
Policy Implications 
Based on lease sales over 1979 to 1996, the exogenous influence of AWL for this sample of 
leases is negatively related to high bonus bids. The most robust models in the present analysis showed 
that AWL causes a fall of bonuses between $1170 to $1309, per acre. Prior literature has yielded 
similar results. 
It is important to note that the regression models in this analysis have significant limitations for 
policy.  First, the data only consists of lease sales between 1979 and 1996 and may or may not be 
                                                 
10 All results are unadjusted for inflation.   17 
transferable to the current time period. However, out-of-sample tests could be used to examine whether 
the results of this analysis are applicable to policy decisions about AWL in the current era.  
It is also worth noting that this analysis has only considered the loss of bonuses as a result of 
AWL. I did not consider the positive effects of AWL, such as an increase in oil supply. For example, if 
the exogenous influence of AWL caused an increase in oil produced, the isolated effect of an increase 
in oil supply would reduce oil prices paid to consumers. Clearly, whether or not to use AWL in OCS 
lease sales is a complicated policy decision that has many considerations.  
 
4.0 Conclusions  
The OCS is thought to have great potential to supplement US long-term energy needs. MMS 
oversees the leasing and revenue collection for the OCS. Since a complete econometric analysis of the 
effects of AWL on government revenue in the Gulf of Mexico has not been conducted in almost 
twenty years, the purpose of this study was to determine the effects of AWL on government revenue. 
Specifically, I estimated the welfare effects of switching from the tract-nomination sale process to 
Area-Wide Leasing in 1983. 
  Regression results are identified characteristics that influence measures of OCS leasing, e.g., 
how many tracts are leased and how much is paid for them. Royalties, tract characteristics, resource 
potential, water depth were found to significantly influence leasing.  
  The most significant finding in this analysis is that on a per acre basis, AWL reduces bonus 
bids by $1170 to $1308. The result is strikingly similar to Moody et al. (1990) and Nebresky (2007), 
which found that AWL drops bonuses by $1337 and $1136 per acre, respectively.   
It is also important note that this study did not simply duplicate the results of Moody et al. 
(1990) and Nebresky (2007). In fact, the beauty of this study is that my findings were generated with a 
different time period and econometric specification.  
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